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Preface to Internet Supplement
This document is an internet supplement to my book “Partially Observed Markov Deci-
sion Processes – From Filtering to Controlled Sensing” published by Cambridge Univer-
sity Press in 2016.
This internet supplement contains exercises, examples and case studies. These have
been put in this internet supplement (instead of the book) so that they can be updated
over time. This document will evolve over time and further discussion and examples will
be added.
The website http://www.pomdp.org contains downloadable software for solving POMDPs
and several examples of POMDPs. I have found that by interfacing the POMDP solver
with Matlab, one can solve several interesting types of POMDPs such as those with non-
linear costs (in terms of the information state) and bandit problems.
I have given considerable thought into designing the exercises and case studies in this
internet supplement. They are mainly mini-research type exercises rather than simplistic
drill type exercises. Some of the problems are extensions of the material in the book. As
time progresses, I hope to incorporate additional case studies and other pedagogical notes
to this document to assist in understanding some of the material in the book.
To avoid confusion in numbering, the equations in this internet supplement are num-
bered consecutively starting from (1) and not chapter wise. In comparison, the equations
in the book are numbered chapterwise.
At can be seen from the content list, this document also contains some short (and in
some cases, fairly incomplete) case studies which will be made more detailed over time.
These case studies were put in this internet supplement in order to keep the size of the
book manageable.
As mentioned above, this internet supplement document is work in progress and will
be updated periodically. I welcome constructive comments from readers. Please email
me at vikramk@ece.ubc.ca
Vikram Krishnamurthy,
2016
Chapter 2
Stochastic State Space Models
1. Theorem ?? dealt with the stationary distribution and eigenvalues of a stochastic
matrix. Parts of Theorem ?? can be shown via elementary linear algebra.
Statement 2: Define spectral radius λ¯(P ) = maxi |λi|
Lemma : λ¯(P ) ≤ ‖P‖∞ where ‖P‖∞ = maxi
∑
j Pij
Proof: For all eigenvalues λ, |λ|‖x‖ = ‖λx‖ = ‖Px‖ ≤ ‖P‖‖x‖ =⇒ |λ| < ‖P‖.
For a stochastic matrix, ‖P‖∞ = 1 and P has an eigenvalue at 1. So λ¯ = 1.
Statement 3: For non-negative matrix A, A′pi = pi implies A′|pi| = |pi|
Proof: |pi| = |A′pi| ≤ |A||pi| = A|pi| So A′|pi| − |pi| ≥ 0.
But A′|pi| − |pi| > 0 is impossible, since it implies 1′A′|pi| > 1′|pi|, i.e., 1′|pi| > 1′|pi|.
2. Farkas’ lemma is a widely used result in linear algebra. It states: Let M be an m× n
matrix and b an m-dimensional vector. Then only one of the following statements is
true:
(a) There exists a vector x ∈ IRn such that Mx = b and x ≥ 0.
(b) There exists a vector y ∈ IRm such that M ′y ≥ 0 and b′y < 0.
Here x ≥ 0 means that all components of the vector x are non-negative.
Use Farkas lemma to prove that every transition matrix P has a stationary distribu-
tion. That is, for any X ×X stochastic matrix P , there exists a probability vector pi
such that P ′pi = pi. (Recall a probability vector pi satisfies pi(i) ≥ 0,∑i pi(i) = 1).
Hint: Write alternative (a) of Farkas lemma as[
(P − I)′
1′
]
pi =
[
0X
1
]
, pi > 0
Show that this has a solution by demonstrating that alternative (b) does not have a
solution.
3. Using the maneuvering target model of Chapter ??, simulate the dynamics and mea-
surement process of a target with the following specifications:
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Sampling interval ∆ = 7 s
Number of measurements N = 50
Initial target position (−500,−500)′ m
Initial target velocity (0.0, 5.0)′ m/s
Transition probability matrix Pij =
{
0.9 if i = j
0.05 otherwise
Maneuver commands (three) fr =
(
0 0 0 0
)′ (straight)
fr =
( −1.225 −0.35 1.225 0.35 )′ (left turn)
fr =
(
1.225 0.35 −1.225 −0.35 )′ (right turn)
Observation matrix C = I4×4
Process noise Q = (0.1)2I4×4
Measurement noise R = diag(20.02, 1.02, 20.02, 1.02)
Measurement volume V [−1000, 1000] m in x and y position
[−10.0, 10.0] m/s in x and y velocity
4. Simulate the optimal predictor via the composition method.
5. As should be apparent from an elementary linear systems course, the algebraic Lya-
punov equation (??) is intimately linked with the stability of a linear discrete time
system. Prove that A has all its eigenvalues strictly inside the unit circle iff for every
positive definite matrix Q, there exists a positive definite matrix Σ∞ such that (??)
holds.
6. Theorem ?? states that |λ2| ≤ ρ(P ). That is, the Dobrushin coefficient upper bounds
the second largest eigenvalue modulus of a stochastic matrix P . Show that
log |λ2| = lim
k→∞
1
k
log ρ(P k)
7. Often for sparse transition matrices, ρ(P ) is typically equal to 1 and therefore not
useful since it provides a trivial upper bound for |λ2|. For example, consider a ran-
dom walk characterized by the tridiagonal transition matrix
P =

r0 p0 0 0 · · · 0
q1 r1 p1 0 · · · 0
0 q2 r2 p2 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 qX−1 rX−1 pX−1
0 · · · 0 0 qX rX

Then using Property 3 of ρ(·) above, clearly ∑l min{Pil, Pjl} = 0, implying that
ρ(P ) = 1. So for this example, the Dobrushin coefficient does not say anything
about the initial condition being forgotten geometrically fast.
For such cases, it is often useful to consider the Dobrushin coefficient of powers of
P . In the above example, clearly every state communicates with every other state
in at least X time points. So PX has strictly positive elements. Therefore ρ(PX)
is strictly smaller than 1 and is a useful bound. Geometric ergodicity follows by
consider blocks of length X , i.e.,
‖PX ′pi − PX ′p¯i‖TV ≤ ρ(PX)‖pi − p¯i‖TV
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8. Show that the inhomogeneous Markov chain with transition matrix
P (2n− 1) =
[
0.5 0.5
1 0
]
, P (2n) =
[
0 1
1 0
]
is weakly ergodic.
9. Wasserstein distance. As mentioned in §??, the Dobrushin coefficient is a special
case of a more general coefficient of ergodicity. This general definition is in terms
of the Wasserstein metric which we now define: Let d be a metric on the state space
X = {e1, e2, . . . , } where the state space is possibly denumerable. Consider the
bivariate random vector (x, y) ∈ X × X with marginals pix and piy, respectively.
Define the Wasserstein distance as
d(pix, piy) = inf E{d(x, y)}
where the infimum is over the joint distribution of (x, y).
(a) Show that the variational distance is a special case of the Wasserstein distance
obtained by choosing d(x, y) as the discrete metric
d(x, y) =
{
1 x 6= y
0 x = y.
(b) Define the coefficient of ergodicity associated with the Wasserstein distance as
ρ(P ) = sup
i 6=j
d(P ′ei, P ′ej)
d(ei, ej)
Show that the Dobrushin coefficient is a special case of the above coefficient of
ergodicity corresponding to the discrete metric.
(c) Show that the above coefficient of ergodicity satisfies properties 2, 4 and 5 of
Theorem ??.
10. Ultrametric transition matrices. It is trivial to verify that Pn is a stochastic ma-
trix for any integer n ≥ 0. Under what conditions is P 1/n a stochastic matrix? A
symmetric ultrametric stochastic matrix P defined in §?? satisfies this property.
11. The MATLAB code to generate a discrete valued random variable with pmf prob is
func t ion rand number = s i m u l a t e s t a t e ( prob ) ; % Acceptance R e j e c t i o n algorithm
statedim = numel ( prob ) ; % dimension of pmf vec tor
mm = max( prob ) ;
c = mm ∗ statedim ;
accept = f a l s e ;
while accept == f a l s e
y = f l o o r ( statedim ∗ rand ) + 1 ; % uniform d i s c r e t e random number
i f rand <= prob ( y ) / mm
rand number = y ;
accept = true ;
end
end
Chapter 3
Optimal Filtering
3.1 Problems
1. Bayes’ rule interpretation of Lasso. Suppose that the state x ∈ IRX is a random
variable with prior pdf
p(x) =
X∏
j=1
λ
2
exp (−λx(j)) .
Suppose x is observed via the observation equation
y = Ax+ v, v ∼N(0, σ2I)
where A is a known matrix. The variance σ2 is not known and has a prior pdf p(σ2).
Then show that the posterior of (x, σ2) given the observation y is of the form
p(x, σ2|y) ∝ p(σ2) (σ2)−n+12 exp (− 1
2σ2
Lasso(x, y, µ)
)
where µ = 2σ2λ and
Lasso(x, y, µ) = ‖y −Ax‖2 + µ‖x‖1.
Therefore for fixed σ2, computing the mode xˆ of the posterior is equivalent to com-
puting the minimizer xˆ of Lasso(x, y, µ).
The resulting Lasso (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) estimator xˆ
was proposed in [83] which is one of the most influential papers in statistics since the
1990s. Since Lasso(x, y, µ) is convex in x it can be computed efficiently via convex
optimization algorithms.
2. Show that if X ≤ Y (with probability 1), then E{X|Z} ≤ E{Y |Z} for any informa-
tion Z.
3. Show that for a linear Gaussian system (??), (??),
p(yk|y1:k−1) = N(yk − yk|k−1, CkΣk|k−1C ′k +Rk)
where yk|k−1 and Σk|k−1 are defined in (??), (??), respectively.
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4. Simulate in Matlab the HMM filter, and fixed lag smoother. Study empirically how
the error probability of the estimates decreases with lag. (The filter is a fixed lag
smoother with lag of zero). Please also refer to [29] for a very nice analysis of error
probabilities.
5. Consider a HMM where the Markov chain evolves slowly with transition matrix
P = I + Q where  is a small positive constant and Q is a generator matrix. That
is Qii < 0, Qij > 0 and each row of Q sums to zero. Compare the performance
of the HMM filter with the recursive least squares algorithm (with an appropriate
forgetting factor chosen) for estimating the underlying state.
6. Consider the following Markov modulated auto-regressive time series model:
zk+1 = A(rk+1) zk + Γ (rk+1)wk+1 + f(rk+1)uk+1
where wk ∼ N(0, 1), uk is a known exogenous input. Assume the sequence {zk} is
observed. Derive an optimal filter for the underlying Markov chain rk. (In compar-
ison to a jump Markov linear system, zk is observed without noise in this problem.
The optimal filter is very similar to the HMM filter).
7. Consider a Markov chain xk corrupted by iid zero mean Gaussian noise and a sinu-
soid:
yk = xk + sin(k/100) + vk
Obtain a filtering algorithm for extracting xk given the observations.
8. Image Based Tracking. The idea is to estimate the coordinates zk of the target
by measuring its orientation rk in noise. For example an imager can determine
which direction an aircraft’s nose is pointing thereby giving useful information
about which direction it can move. Assume that the target’s orientation evolves
according to a finite state Markov chain. (In other words, the imager quantizers the
target orientation to one of a finite number of possibilities.) Then the model for the
filtering problem is
zk+1 = A(rk+1) zk + Γ (rk+1)wk+1
yk ∼ p(y|rk)
Derive the filtering expression for E{zk|y1, . . . , yk}.
9. Consider a jump Markov linear system. Via computer simulations, compare the
IMM algorithm, Unscented Kalman filter and particle filter.
10. Radar pulse train de-interleaving. In radar signal processing, radar pulses are
received from multiple periodic sources. It is of interest to estimate the periods of
these sources. For example, suppose:
• source 1 pulses are received at times
2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27, 32, 37, 42, . . . , (period = 5, phase =2)
• source 2 pulses are received at times
4, 15, 26, 37, 48, 59, 70, 81, . . . , (period = 11, phase = 4) .
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The interleaved signal consists of pulses at times
2, 4, 7, 12, 15, 22, 26, 27, 32, 37, 42, . . . .
So the above interleaved signal contains time of arrival information. Note that at
time 37, pulses are received from both sources; but it is assumed that there is no
amplitude information - so the received signal is simply a time of arrival event at
time 37. At the receiver, interleaved signal (time of arrivals) is corrupted by jitter
noise (modeled as iid noise). So the noisy received signal are, for example,
2.4, 4.1, 6.7, 11.4, 15.5, 21.9, 26.2, 27.5, 30.9, 38.2, 43.6, . . . .
Given this noisy interleaved signal, the de-interleaving problem aims to determine
which pulses came from which source. This can be done by estimating the periods
(namely, 5 and 11) and phases (namely, 2 and 4) of the 2 sources.
The de-interleaving problem can be formulated as a jump Markov linear system.
Define the state x′k = (T
′, τ ′k), consists of the periods T
′ = (T (1), . . . , T (N)) of the
N sources and τ ′k = (τ
(1)
k , . . . , τ
(N)
k ), where τ
(i)
k denotes the last time source i was
active up to and including the arrival of the kth pulse. Let τ1 = (φ(1), . . . , φ(N)), be
the phases of periodic pulse-train sources. Then
τ ik+1 =
{
τ ik + T
i if (k + 1)th pulse is due to source i
τ ik otherwise
; τ i1 = φ
(i). (1)
Let ei, i = 1, . . . , N , be the unit N -dimensional vectors with 1 in the ith position. Let
rk ∈ {1, . . . , N} denote the active source at time k. Then one can express the time of
arrivals as the jump Markov linear system
xk+1 = A(rk+1)xk + wk
yk = C(rk)xk + vk
where
A(rk+1) =
[
IN 0N×N
diag(erk+1) IN
]
, C(rk) =
[
01×N e′rk
]
Note that rk is a periodic process and so has transition probabilities
Pi,i+1 = 1, for i < N , and PN,1 = 1.
vk denotes the measurement (jitter) noise; while wk can be used to model time vary-
ing periods.
Remark: Obviously, there are identifiability issues; for example, if φ(1) = φ(2) and
T (1 is a multiple of T (2) then it is impossible to detect source 1.
11. Narrowband Interference and JMLS. Narrowband interference corrupting a Markov
chain can be modeled as a jump Markov linear system. Narrowband interference
can be modeled as an auto-regressive (AR) process with poles close to the unit circle:
for example
ik = a ik−1 + wk
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where a = 1−  and  is a small positive number. Consider the observation model
yk = xk + ik + vk
where xk is a finite state Markov chain, ik is narrowband interference and vk is
observation noise. Show that the above model can be represented as a jump Markov
linear system.
12. Bayesian estimation of Stochastic context free grammar. First some perspective:
HMMs with a finite observation space are also called regular grammars. They are a
subset of a more general class of models called stochastic context free grammars as
depicted by Chomsky’s hierarchy in Figure 3.1.
Definition 2.2: A deterministic grammar G is a four-tuple
G ¼ ðA; E;!; S0Þ (3)
where:
A is the alphabet (the set of terminal symbols of
the grammar);
E is the set of nonterminal symbols of the
grammar;
! is the finite set of grammatical production rules
(syntactic rules);
S0 is the starting nonterminal.
In general, ! is a partially defined function of type
! : ðA [ EÞ$ ! ðA [ EÞ$: (4)
However, as we will see later, certain restrictions applied
to the production rules ! allow us to define some very
useful types of grammars.
In the rest of this paper, unless specified otherwise,
we will write nonterminal symbols as capital letters, and
symbols of the alphabet using lower case letters. This
follows the default convention of the theory of formal
languages.
Def. 2.1 provides a set-theoretic definition of a formal
language. Now, using Def. 2.2 we can redefine the
language in terms of its grammar L ¼" LðGÞ.
To illustrate the use of grammars, consider a simple
language L ¼ LðGÞ whose grammar G ¼ ðA; E;!; S0Þ is
defined as follows:
A ¼ fa; bg S0 ! aS1jb
E ¼ fS0; S1g S1 ! bS0ja: (5)
These are some of the valid strings in this language, and
examples of how they can be derived by repeated
application of the production rules of (5):
1) S0 ) b;
2) S0 ) aS1 ) aa;
3) S0 ) aS1 ) abS0 ) abb;
4) S0 ) aS1 ) abS0 ) abaS1 ) abaa;
5) S0 ) aS1 ) abS0 ) abaS1 ) ababS0 ) ababb;
6) S0 ) aS1 ) abS0 ) abaS1 ) ababS0 ) . . .
) ababab . . . abb;
7) S0 ) aS1 ) abS0 ) abaS1 ) ababS0 ) . . .
) ababab . . . abaa.
This language contains an infinite number of strings
that can be of arbitrary length. The strings start with either
a or b. If a string starts with b, then it only contains one
symbol. Strings terminate with either aa or bb, and consist
of a distinct repeating pattern ab.
This simple example illustrates the power of the
grammatical representation of languages. Very simple
grammars can define rather sophisticated languages.
3) Chomsky Hierarchy of Grammars: In Def. 2.2, the
production rules of the grammar are given in a very general
form. Reference [10] used the properties of the production
rules of grammars to develop a very useful hierarchy that is
known in the literature as the Chomsky hierarchy of
grammars.
• Regular Grammars (RG): Only production rules
of the form S ! aS or S ! a are allowed. This
means that the left-hand side of the production
must contain one nonterminal only, and the right-
hand side could be either one terminal or one
terminal followed by one nonterminal. The gram-
mar of the language in the last example of this
section is a regular grammar. Regular grammars
are sometimes referred to as finite-state grammars.
• CFGs: Any production rule of the form S ! ! is
allowed. This means that the left-hand side of the
production rule must contain one nonterminal
only, whereas the right-hand side can be any
string.
• Context-Sensitive Grammars (CSG): Production
rules of the form "1S"2 ! "1!"2 are allowed.
Here "1;"2 2 ðA [ EÞ$, and ! 6¼ ". In other
words, the allowed transformations of nonterminal
S are dependent on its context "1 and "2.
• Unrestricted Grammars (UG): Any production
rules of the form "1S"2 ! # are allowed. Here "1,
"2, # 2 ðA [ EÞ$. The unrestricted grammars are
also often referred to as type-0 grammars due to
Chomsky [10].
Chomsky also classified languages in terms of the
grammars that can be used to define them. Fig. 1 illustrates
this hierarchy of languages. Each inner circle of this
diagram is a subset of the outer circle. Thus, context-
sensitive language (CSL) is a special (more rest icted) form
of unrestricted language (UL), context-free language (CFL)
is a special case of CSL, and regular language (RL) is a
Fig. 1. The Chomsky hierarchy of formal languages.
Visnevski et al. : Syntactic Modeling and Signal Processing of Multifunction Radars
Vol. 95, No. 5, May 2007 | Proceedings of the IEEE 1003
Figure 3.1: The Chomsky hierarchy of languages
Stochastic context free grammars (SCFGs) provide a powerful modeling tool for
strings of alphabets and are used widely in natural language processing [56]. For ex-
ample, consider the randomly generated string ancmbn wherem,n are non-negative
integer valued random variables. Here an means the alphabet a repeated n times.
The string ancmbn could model the trajectory of a target that moves n steps north
and then an arbitrary number of steps east or west and then n steps south, implying
that the target performs a U-turn. A basic course in computer science would show
(using a pumping lemma) that such strings cannot be generated exclusively using a
Markov chain (since the memory n is variable).
If the string ancmbn was observed in noise, then Bayesian estimation (stochastic
parsing) algorithms can be used to estimate the underlying string. Such meta-level
tracking algorithms have polynomial computational cost (in the data length) and
are useful for for estimating trajectories of targets (given noisy position and velocity
measurements). They allow a human radar operator to interpret tracks and can be
viewed as middleware in the human-sensor interface. Such stochastic context free
grammars generalize HMMs and facilitate modeling complex spatial trajectories of
targets.
Please refer to [56] for Bayesian signal processing algorithms and EM algorithms
for stochastic context free grammars. [23, 22] gives examples of meta-level target
tracking using stochastic context free grammars.
13. Kalman vs HMM filter. A Kalman filter is the optimal state estimator for the linear
Gaussian state space model
xk+1 = Axk + wk,
yk = C
′xk + vk.
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where w and v are mutually independent iid Gaussian processes.
Recall from (??), (??) that for a Markov chain with state space X = {e1, . . . , eX} of
unit vectors, an HMM can be expressed as
xk+1 = P
′xk + wk,
yk = C
′xk + vk.
A key difference is that in (??), w is no longer i.i.d; instead if is a martingale differ-
ence process: E{wk|x0, x1, . . . , xk} = 0.
From §??, it follows that the Kalman filter is the minimum variance linear estima-
tor for the above HMM. Of course the optimal linear estimator (Kalman filter) can
perform substantially worse than the optimal estimator (HMM filter). Compare the
performance of the HMM filter and Kalman filter numerically for the above exam-
ple.
14. Interpolation of a HMM. Consider a Markov chain xk with transition matrix P
where the discrete time clock ticks at intervals of 10 seconds. Assume noisy mea-
surements are obtained of at each time k. Devise a smoothing algorithm to estimate
the state of the Markov chain at 5 second intervals. (Note: Obviously on the 5 sec-
ond time scale, the transition matrix is P 1/2. For this to be a valid stochastic matrix
it is sufficient that P is a symmetric ultrametric matrix or more generally P−1 is an
M-matrix [34]; see also §??.)
3.2 Case Study. Sensitivity of HMM filter to transition matrix
Almost an identical proof to that of geometric ergodicity proof of the HMM filter in §??
can be used to obtain expressions for the sensitivity of the HMM filter to the HMM pa-
rameters.
Aim: We are interested in a recursion for ‖pik − pik‖1 when pik is updated with HMM
filter using transition matrix P and pik is updated with HMM filter using transition matrix
P . That is, we want an expression for
‖T (pi, y;P )− T (pi, y;P )‖1 in terms of {pi − pi‖1. (2)
Such an bound if useful when the HMM filter is implemented with an incorrect transition
matrix P instead of actual transition matrix P . The hope is that when P is close to P then
T (pi, y;P ) is close to T (pi, y;P ).
A special case of (2) is to obtain an expression for
‖T (pi, y;P )− T (pi, y;P )‖1 (3)
that is when both HMM filters have the same initial belief pi but are updated with different
transition matrices, namely P and P .
The theorem below obtains expressions for both (2) and (3).
Theorem. Consider a HMM with transition matrix P and state levels g. Let  > 0 denote the
user defined parameter. Suppose ‖P − P‖1 ≤ , where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the induced 1-norm for
matrices.1 Then
1The three statements ‖P ′pi−P ′pi‖1 ≤ , ‖P −P‖1 ≤  and∑Xi=1 ‖(P ′−P ′):,i‖1pi(i) ≤  are all equivalent
since ‖pi‖1 = 1.
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1. The expected absolute deviation between one step of filtering using P versus P is upper
bounded as:
Ey
∣∣g′ (T (pi, y;P )− T (pi, y;P ))∣∣ ≤ ∑
y
max
i,j
g′(I − T (pi, y;P )1′)By(ei − ej) (4)
2. The sample paths of the filtered posteriors and conditional means have the following explicit
bounds at each time k:
‖pik − pik‖1 ≤

max{A(pik−1, yk)− , µ(yk)}
+
ρ(P ) ‖pik−1 − pik−1‖1
A(pik−1, yk)
(5)
Here ρ(P ) denotes the Dobrushin coefficient of the transition matrix P and pik is the poste-
rior computed using the HMM filter with P , and
A(pi, y) =
1′ByP ′pi
maxiBi,y
, µ(y) =
miniBiy
maxiBiy
. (6)
The above theorem gives explicit upper bounds between the filtered distributions us-
ing transition matrices P and P¯ . The Ey in (4) is with respect to the measure σ(pi, y;P ) =
1′ByP ′pi which corresponds to P(yk = y|pik−1 = pi).
Proof. The triangle inequality for norms yields
‖pik+1 − pik+1‖TV = ‖T (pik, yk+1;P )− T (pik, yk+1;P )‖TV
≤ ‖T (pik, yk+1;P )− T (pik, yk+1;P )‖TV
+ ‖T (pik, yk+1;P )− T (pik, yk+1;P )‖TV. (7)
Part 1: Consider the first normed term in the right hand side of (7). Applying (??) with
pi = P ′pik and pi0 = P ′pik yields
g′(T (pik, y;P ) − T (pik, y;P )) = 1
σ(pi, y;P )
g′
[
I − T (pi, y, P )1′]By(P − P )′pi
where σ(pi, y;P ) = 1′ByP ′pi. Then Lemma ??(i) yields
g′(T (pik, y;P )− T (pik, y;P ))
≤ max
i,j
1
σ(pi, y;P )
g′
[
I − T (pi, y, P )1′]By(ei − ej)‖P ′pi − P ′pi‖TV
Since ‖P ′pi − P ′pi‖TV ≤ , taking expectations with respect to the measure σ(pi, y;P ), com-
pletes the proof of the first assertion.
Part 2: Applying Theorem ??(i) with the notation pi = P ′pik and pi0 = P ′pik yields
‖T (pik, y;P )− T (pik, y;P )‖TV ≤ maxiBi,y‖P
′pik − P ′pik‖TV
1′ByP ′pik
≤ 
2
maxiBi,y
1′ByP ′pik
≤ maxiBi,y /2
max{1′ByP ′pik − maxiBiy,miniBiy}
. (8)
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The second last inequality follows from the construction of P satisfying (??) (recall the
variational norm is half the l1 norm). The last inequality follows from Theorem ??(ii).
Consider the second normed term in the right hand side of (7). Applying Theorem
??(i) with notation pi = P ′pik and pi0 = P ′pik yields
‖T (pik, y;P )− T (pik, y;P )‖TV ≤
maxiBi,y‖P ′pik − P ′pik‖TV
1′ByP ′pik
≤ maxiBi,y ρ(P ) ‖pik − pik‖TV
1′ByP ′pik
(9)
where the last inequality follows from the submultiplicative property of the Dobrushin
coefficient. Substituting (8) and (9) into the right hand side of the triangle inequality (7)
proves the result.
Chapter 4
Algorithms for Maximum Likelihood
Parameter Estimation
1. EM algorithm in more elegant (abstract) notation. Let {Pθ , θ ∈ Θ} be a family of
probability measures on a measurable space (Ω,F) all absolutely continuous with
respect to a fixed probability measure P0, and let Y ⊂ F . The likelihood function
for computing an estimate of the parameter θ based on the information available in
Y is
L(θ) = E0[
dPθ
dP0
| Y] ,
and the MLE estimate is defined by
θ̂ ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
L(θ) .
In general, the MLE is difficult to compute directly, and the EM algorithm provides
an iterative approximation method :
Step 1. Set p = 0 and choose θ̂0.
Step 2. (E–step) Set θ′ = θ̂p and compute Q(·, θ′), where
Q(θ, θ′) = Eθ′ [log
dPθ
dPθ′
| Y] .
Step 3. (M–step) Find
θ̂p+1 ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
Q(θ, θ′) .
Step 4. Replace p by p + 1 and repeat beginning with Step 2, until a stopping
criterion is satisfied.
The sequence generated {θ̂p , p ≥ 0} gives non–decreasing values of the likelihood
function : indeed, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that
logL(θ̂p+1)− logL(θ̂p) ≥ Q(θ̂p+1, θ̂p) ≥ Q(θ̂p, θ̂p) = 0 ,
with equality if and only if θ̂p+1 = θ̂p.
14
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2. Forward-only EM algorithm for Linear Gaussian Model. In §4.4 we described a
forward-only EM algorithm for ML parameter estimation of the a HMM. Forward-
only EM algorithms can also be constructed for maximum likelihood estimation of
the parameters of a a linear Gaussian state space model [20]. These involve comput-
ing filters for functionals of the state and use Kalman filter estimates.
3. Sinusoid in HMM. Consider a sinusoid with amplitude A and phase φ. It is ob-
served as
yk = xk +A sin(k/100 + φ) + vk
where vk is an iid Gaussian noise process. Use the EM algorithm to estimate A, φ
and the parameters of the Markov chain and noise variance.
4. In the forward-only EM algorithm of §4.4, the filters for the number of jumps in-
volves O(X4) computations at each time while filters for the duration time involve
O(X3) at each time. Is it possible to reduce the computational cost by approximating
some of these estimates?
5. Using computer simulations, compare the methods of moments estimator for a
HMM in §4.5 with the maximum likelihood estimator in terms of efficiency. That
is generate several N point trajectories of an HMM with a fixed set of parameters,
then compute the variance of the estimates. (Of course, instances where the MLE the
algorithm converges to local maxima should be eliminated from the computation).
6. Non-asymptotic statistical inference using concentration of measure if very popular
today. Assuming the likelihood is a Lipschitz function of the observations, and the
observations are Markovian, show that the likelihood function concentrates to the
Kullback Leibler function.
7. EM Algorithm for State Estimation. The EM algorithm was used in Chapter ?? as a
numerical algorithm for maximum likelihood parameter estimation. It turns out that
the EM algorithm can be used for state estimation, particularly for a jump Markov
linear system (JMLS). Recall from §?? that a JMLS has model
zk+1 = A(rk+1) zk + Γ (rk+1)wk+1 + f(rk+1)uk+1
yk = C(rk) zk +D(rk) vk + g(rk)uk.
As described in §??, the optimal filter for a JMLS is computationally intractable. In
comparison for a JMLS, the EM algorithm can be used to estimate the MAP (maxi-
mum aposteriori state estimate). system (assuming the parameters of the JMLS are
known). Show how one can compute this MAP state estimate maxz1:k,r1:k P (y1:k|z1:k, r1:k)
using the EM algorithm. In [51] is shown that the resulting EM algorithm involves
the cross coupling of a Kalman and HMM smoother. A data augmentation algo-
rithm in similar spirit appears in [18].
Chapter 5
Multi-agent Sensing: Social Learning
and Data Incest
1. A substantial amount of insight can be gleaned by actually simulating the setup (in
Matlab) of the social learning filter for both the random variable and Markov chain
case. Also simulate the risk-averse social learning filter discussed in §??.
2. Effect of multinomial sampling on herding.
3. CVaR Social Learning Filter. Consider the risk averse social learning discussed in
§??. Suppose agents choose their actions ak to minimize the CVaR measure
ak = argmin
a∈A
{min
z∈R
{z + 1
α
Eyk [max{(c(xk, a)− z), 0}]}}
Here α ∈ (0, 1] reflects the degree of risk-aversion for the agent (the smaller α is, the
more risk-averse the agent is). Show that the structural result Theorem ?? continues
to hold for the CVaR social learning filter. Also show that for sufficiently risk-averse
agents (namely, α close to zero), social learning ceases and agents always herd.
Generalize the above result to any coherent risk measure.
4. The necessary and sufficient condition given in Theorem ?? for exact data incest
removal requires that
An(j, n) = 0 =⇒ wn(j) = 0, where wn = T−1n−1tn,
and Tn = sgn((In−An)−1) =
[
Tn−1 tn
01×n−1 1
]
is the transitive closure matrix. Thus the
condition depends purely on the adjacency matrix. Discuss what types of matrices
satisfy the above condition.
5. Theorem ?? also applies to data incest where the prior and likelihood are Gaussian.
The posterior is then evaluated by a Kalman filter. Compare the performance of
exact data incest removal with the covariance intersection algorithm in [16] which
assumes no knowledge of the correlation structure (and hence of the network).
16
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6. Consensus algorithms [69] are extremely popular during the last decade and there
are numerous papers in the area. They are non-Bayesian and seek to compute, for
example, the average over measurements observed at a number of nodes in a graph.
It is worthwhile comparing the performance of the optimal Bayesian incest removal
algorithms with consensus algorithms.
7. The data incest removal algorithm in §?? arises assumes that agents do not send
additional information apart from their incest free estimates. Suppose agents are
allowed to send a fixed number of labels of previous agents from whom they have
received information. What is the minimum about of additional labels the agents
need to send in order to completely remove data incest.
8. Quantify the bias introduced by data incest as a function of the adjacency matrix.
9. Prospect theory (pioneered by the psychologist Kahneman [36] who won the 2003
Nobel prize in economics) is a behavioral economic theory that seek to model how
humans make decisions amongst probabilistic alternatives. (It is an alternative to
expected utility theory considered in the social learning models of this chapter.)
The main features are:
(a) Preference is an S-shaped curve with reference point x = 0
(b) The investor maximizes the expected value V (x) where V is a preference and
x is the change in wealth.
(c) Decision maker employ decision weight w(p) rather than objective probabil-
ity p, where the weight function w(F ) has a reverse S shape where F is the
cumulative probability.
Construct a social learning filter where the utility function satisfies the above as-
sumptions. Under what conditions do information cascades occur?
10. There are several real life experiments that seek to understand how humans interact
in decision making. See for example [7] and [44]. In [7], four models are considered.
How can these models be linked to social learning?
Chapter 6
Fully Observed Markov Decision
Processes
6.1 Problems
1. The following nice example from [49] gives a useful motivation for feedback control
in stochastic systems.
(a) First, recall from undergraduate control courses that for a linear time invariant
system with forward transfer function G(z−1) and negative feedback H(z−1),
the equivalent transfer function is G(z
−1)
1+G(z−1)H(z−1) . So an open loop system with
this equivalent transfer function is identical to a feedback system.
(b) More generally, consider the deterministic system
xk+1 = φ(xk, uk), yk = ψ(xk, uk)
Suppose the actions are given by a policy of the form
uk = µ(x0:k, y1:k)
Then clearly, the open loop system,
xk+1 = φ(xk, µ(x0:k, y1:k)), yk = ψ(xk, µ(x0:k, y1:k))
generates the same state and observation sequences.
(c) Now consider a fully observed stochastic system with feedback:
xk+1 = xk + uk + wk,
uk = −xk
(10)
where wk is iid with zero mean and variance σ2 (as usual we assume x0 is
independent of {wk}.) Then xk+1 = wk and so uk = −wk−1 for k = 1, 2, . . . .
Therefore E{xk} = 0 and Var{x2k} = σ2.
(d) Finally, consider an open loop stochastic system where uk is a deterministic
sequence:
xk+1 = xk + uk + wk
18
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Then E{xk} = E{x0} +
∑k−1
n=0 uk and Var{x2k} = E{x20} + kσ2. Clearly, it is
impossible to construct a deterministic input sequence that yields a zero mean
state with variance σ2.
2. An investor buys a call option at a price p. He has N days to exercise this option. If
the investor exercises the option when the stock price is x, he gets x− p dollars. The
investor can also decide not the exercise the option at all.
Assume the stock price evolves as xk = x0 +
∑k
n=1wn where {wn} is in iid process.
Let τ denote the day the investor decides to exercise the option. Determine the
optimal investment strategy to maximize
E{(xτ − p)I(τ ≤ T )}.
This is an example of a fully observed stopping time problem. Chapter ?? considers
more general stopping time POMDPs.
Note: Define sk ∈ {0, 1} where sk = 0 means that the option has not been exercised
until time k. sk = 1 means that the option has been exercised before time k. Define
the state zk = (xk, sk).
Denote the action uk = 1 to exercise option and uk = 0 means do not exercise option.
Then the dynamics are
zk+1 = max{zk, uk}, xk+1 = xk + wk
The reward at each time k is r(zk, uk, k) = (1 − sk)uk(xk − p) and the problem can
be formulated as
max
µ
E{
N∑
k=1
r(zk, uk, k)}
3. Discounted cost problems can also be motivated as stopping time problems (with
a random termination time). Suppose at each time k, the MDP can terminate with
probability 1 − ρ or continue with probability ρ. Let τ denote the random variable
for the termination time. Consider the undiscounted cost MDP
Eµ
{
τ∑
k=0
c(xk, uk) | x0 = i
}
= Eµ
{ ∞∑
k=0
I(k ≤ τ) c(xk, uk) | x0 = i
}
= Eµ
{ ∞∑
k=0
ρkc(xk, uk) | x0 = i
}
.
The last equality follows since P(k ≤ τ) = ρk.
4. Deterministic and stochastic LQ control
5. Modified Policy iteration
6. Afriat’s test for a single jump change in utility function.
7. We discussed risk averse utilities and dynamic risk measures briefly in §??. Also
§?? discussed revealed preferences for constructing a utility function from a dataset.
Given a utility function U(x), a widely used measure for the degree of risk aversion
is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient which is defined as
a(x) = −d
2U/dx2
dU/dx
.
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This is often termed as an absolute risk aversion measure, while x a(x) is termed
a relative risk aversion measure. Can this risk averse coefficient be used for mean
semi-deviation risk, conditional value at risk( CVaR) and exponential risk?
8. A classical result involving utility functions is the following [33, pp.42]: A rational
decision maker who compares random variables only according to their means and
variances must have preferences consistent with a quadratic utility function. Prove
this result.
6.2 Case study. Non-cooperative Discounted Cost Markov games
§?? of the book dealt with infinite horizon discounted MDPs. Below we introduce briefly
some elementary ideas in non-cooperative infinite horizon discounted Markov games.
There are several excellent books in the area [41, 8].
Markov games can be viewed as a multi-agent decentralized extension of MDPs. Our
aim here is to consider some simple cases where the Nash equilibrium can be obtained by
solving a linear programming problem.1
Consider the following infinite horizon discounted cost two-payer Markovian game.
There are two decision makers (players) indexed by l = 1, 2.
• Let u(1)k ∈ U and u(2)k ∈ U denote the actions of player 1 and player 2 at time k. For
convenience we assume the same action space for both players.
• The cost incurred by player l ∈ {1, 2} for state x, actions u(1), u(2) is cl(x, u(1), u(2)).
• The transition probabilities of the Markov process x depends on the actions of both
players:
Pij(u
(1), u(2)) = P(xk+1 = j|xk = i, u(1)k = u(1), u(2)k = u(2))
• Define the policies for the stationary (randomized) Markovian policies for two play-
ers as µ(1), µ(2), respectively. So u(1)k is chosen from probability distribution µ
(1)(xk)
and u(2)k is chosen from probability distribution µ
(2)(xk). For convenience denote
the class of stationary Markovian policies as µS .
• The cumulative cost incurred by each player l ∈ {1, 2} is
J
(l)
µ(1),µ(2)
(x) = E
{ ∞∑
k=0
ρkcl(xk, u
(1)
k , u
(2)
k )|x0 = x
}
where as usual ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
The non-cooperative assumption in game theory is that the players are interested in
minimizing their individual cumulative costs only; they do not collude.
Nash Equilibrium. Assume that each player has complete knowledge of the other
player’s cost function. Then the policies µ(1)
∗
, µ(2)
∗
of the non-cooperative infinite horizon
1The reader should be cautious with decentralized stochastic control. The famous Witsenhausen’s coun-
terexample formulated in the 1960s shows that even a deceptively simple toy problem in decentralized
stochastic control can be very difficult to solve, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witsenhausen\%27s_
counterexample
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Markov game constitute a Nash equilibrium if
J
(1)
µ(1)
∗
,µ(2)
∗(x) ≤ J (1)
µ(1),µ(2)
∗(x), for all µ(1) ∈ µS
J
(1)
µ(1)
∗
,µ(2)
∗(x) ≤ J (1)
µ(1)
∗
,µ(2)
(x), for all µ(2) ∈ µS .
(11)
This means that unilateral deviations from µ(1)
∗
, µ(2)
∗
result in either player being worse
off (incurring a larger cost). Since in a non-cooperative game collusion is not allowed,
there is no rational reason for players to deviate from the Nash equilibrium.
In game theory, two important issues are:
• Does a Nash equilibrium exist? in this case. For the above discounted cost game
with finite action and state space, the answer is ”yes”.
Theorem 6.2.1. A discounted Markov game has at least one Nash equilibrium within the
class of Markovian stationary (randomized) policies.
The proof of existence involves Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.2
• How can the Nash equilibria be computed? In general, the above Markovian game
can have several Nash equilibria and computing them is difficult.
The main aim below is to give special cases of zero-sum Markov games where the Nash
equilibrium can be computed via linear programming. (Recall §?? shows how a dis-
counted cost MDP can be solved via linear programming.)
6.2.1 Zero-sum discounted Markov game
A discounted Markovian game is said to be zero sum3 if
c1(x, u
(1), u(2)) + c2(x, u
(1), u(2)) = 0.
That is,
c(x, u(1), u(2))
defn
= c1(x, u
(1), u(2)) = −c2(x, u(1), u(2)).
For a zero sum game, the Nash equilibrium (11) become a saddle point:
Jµ(1)∗,µ(2)(x) ≤ Jµ(1)∗,µ(2)∗(x) ≤ Jµ(1),µ(2)∗(x).
that is, it is a minimum in the µ(1) direction and a maximum in the µ(2) direction.
A well known result from the 1950s due to Shapley is:
Theorem 6.2.2 (Shapley). A zero sum infinite horizon discounted cost Markov game has a
unique value function, even though there could be multiple Nash equilibria (saddle points).
2Existence proofs for equilibria involve using either Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (which generalizes
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to set valued correspondences) or Tarski’s fixed point theorem (which applies
to supermodular games). Please see [57] for a nice intuitive visual illustration of these fixed point theorems.
3A constant sum game c1(x, u(1), u(2)) + c2(x, u(1), u(2)) = K for constant K is equivalent to a zero sum
game. Define c¯l(x, u(1), u(2)) = cl(x, u(1), u(2)) +K/2, l = 1, 2, resulting in a zero sum game in terms of c¯l.
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The value function of the zero-sum game is
Jµ(1)∗,µ(2)∗(i) = V (i)
where V satisfies an equation that resembles dynamic programming:
V (i) = val
[
(1− ρ)c(i, u(1), u(2)) + ρ
∑
j
Pij(u
(1), u(2))V (j)
]
u(1),u(2)
(12)
where val[M ]u(1),u(2) denotes the value of the matrix
4 game with elements M(u(1), u(2)).
Even though for a specific vector V , the val[·] in the right hand side of (12) can be evaluated
by solving an LP, it is not useful for the Markov zero sum game, since we have a functional
equation in the variable V . So solving a zero sum Markov game is difficult in general.
To give more insight, as we did in the discounted cost MDP case, let us formulate
computing the Nash equilibrium (saddle point) of the zero sum Markov game as an op-
timization problem. In the MDP case we obtained a LP; for the Markov game (as shown
below) we obtain a non-convex bilinear optimization problem.
Define the randomized policy of player 1 (minimizer) and player 2 (maximizer) as
p(i, u(1)) = P(u(1)k = u
(1)|xk = i), q(i, u(2)) = P(u(2)k = u(2)|xk = i)
In complete analogy to the discounted MDP case in (??), player 2 optimal strategy q∗ is
the solution of
max
V
∑
i
αiV (i) with respect to (V , q)
subject to V (i) ≤
∑
u(2)
c(i, u(1), u(2))q(i, u(2)) + ρ
∑
j∈X
∑
u(2)
Pij(u
(1), u(2))q(i, u(2))V (j),
q(i, u(2)) ≥ 0,
∑
u(2)
q(i, u(2)) = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , X, u(2) = 1, 2, . . . , U.
(14)
4A matrix game is of the form: Given a m× n matrix M , determine the Nash equilibrium
(x∗, y∗) = argmax
x
argmin
y
y′Mx, where x, y are probability vectors
The value of this matrix game is val[M ] = y∗′Mx∗ and is computed as the solution of a linear programming
(LP) problem as follows: Clearly maxx miny y′Ax = maxx mini e′iAx where ei, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m denotes the
unit m-dimensional vector with 1 in the i-th position. This follows since a linear function is minimized at
its extreme points. So the minimization over continuum has been reduced to one over a finite set. Denoting
z = mini e
′
iAx, the value of the game is the solution of the following LP:
val[M ] =

Compute max z
z < e′iMx, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
1′x = 1, xj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2 . . . , n
(13)
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By symmetry, player 1 optimal strategy p∗ is the solution of
min
V
∑
i
αiV (i) with respect to (V , p)
subject to V (i) ≥
∑
u(2)
c(i, u(1), u(2))p(i, u(1)) + ρ
∑
j∈X
∑
u(1)
Pij(u
(1), u(2))p(i, u(1))V (j),
p(i, u(1)) ≥ 0,
∑
u(1)
p(i, u(1)) = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , X, u(1) = 1, 2, . . . , U.
(15)
The key difference between the above discounted Markov game problem and the dis-
counted MDP (??) is that the above equations are no longer LPs. Indeed the constraints
are bilinear in (V , q) and (V , p). So the constraint set for a zero-sum Markov game is
non-convex. Despite being nonconvex, in light of Shapley’s theorem all local minima are
global minima.
We now give two special examples of zero-sum Markov games that can be solved as
an LP.
Example 1. Single Controller zero-sum Markov Game
In a single controller Markov game, the transition probabilities are controlled by one
player only; we assume that this is player 1. So
Pij(u
(1), u(2)) = Pij(u
(1)) = P(xk+1 = j|xk = i, u(1)k = u(1))
Due to this assumption, the constraint in (16) becomes linear, namely
V (i) ≤
∑
u(2)
c(i, u(1), u(2))q(i, u(2)) + ρ
∑
j∈X
Pij(u
(1))V (j)
since
∑
u(2) q(i, u
(2)) = 1. Therefore (16) is now an LP which can be solved for q∗, namely:
max
V
∑
i
αiV (i) with respect to (V , q)
subject to V (i) ≤
∑
u(2)
c(i, u(1), u(2))q(i, u(2)) + ρ
∑
j∈X
Pij(u
(1))V (j),
q(i, u(2)) ≥ 0,
∑
u(2)
q(i, u(2)) = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , X, u(2) = 1, 2, . . . , U.
(16)
Solving the above LP yields the Nash equilibrium policy µ(2) for player 2.
The dual problem to (16) is the linear program
Minimize
∑
i∈X
z(i) with respect to (z, p)
subject to p(i, u(1)) ≥ 0, i ∈ X , u ∈ U∑
u(1)
p(j, u(1)) = ρ
∑
i
∑
u(1)
Pij(u
(1)) p(i, u(1)) + αj , j ∈ X .
z(i) ≥
∑
u(1)
p(i, u(1)) c(i, u(1), u(2))
The above dual gives the Nash equilibrium policy p∗ for player 1.
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6.2.2 Example 2. Switching Controller Markov Game
Chapter 7
Partially Observed Markov Decision
Processes (POMDPs)
Several well studied instances of POMDPs and their parameter files can be found at
http://www.pomdp.org/examples/
1. Much insight can be gained by simulating the dynamic programming recursion for
a 3-state POMDP. The belief state needs to be quantized to a finite grid. We also
strongly recommend using the exact POMDP solver in [?] to gain insight into the
piecewise linear concave nature of the value function.
2. Implement Lovejoy’s suboptimal algorithm and compare its performance with the
optimal policy.
3. Tiger problem: This is a colorful name given to the following POMDP problem.
A tiger resides behind one of two doors, a left door (l) and a right door (r). The state
x ∈ {l, r} denotes the position of a tiger. The action u ∈ {l, r, h} denotes a human
either opening the left door (l), opening the right door (r), or simply hearing (h)
the growls of the tiger. If the human opens a door, he gets a perfect measurement
of the position of the tiger (if the tiger is not behind the door he opens, then it must
be behind the other door). If the human chooses action h then he hears the growls
of the tiger which gives noisy information about the tiger’s position. Denote the
probabilities Bll(h) = p, Brr(h) = q.
Every time the human chooses the action to open a door, the problem resets and
the tiger is put with equal probability behind one of the doors. (So the transition
probabilities for the l and r actions are 0.5).
The cost of opening the door behind where the tiger is hiding is α, possibly reflecting
injury from the tiger. The cost of opening the other door is −β indicating a reward.
Finally the cost of hearing and not opening a door is γ.
The aim is to minimize the cost (maximize the reward) over a finite or infinite hori-
25
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zon. To summarize, the POMDP parameters of the tiger problem are:
X = {l, r},Y = {l, r}, U = {l, r, h},
B(l) = B(r) = I2×2, B(h) =
[
p 1− p
1− q q
]
P (l) = P (r) =
[
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
]
, P (h) = I2×2,
cl = (α,−β)′, cr = (−β, α)′, ch = (γ, γ)′
4. Open Loop Feedback Control. As described in §??, open loop feedback control is a
useful suboptimal scheme for solving POMDPs. Is is possible to exploit knowledge
that the value function of a POMDP is piecewise linear and concave in the design of
an open loop feedback controller?
5. Finitely transient policies were discussed in §7.6. For a 2-state 2-action 2-observation
POMDP, give an example of POMDP parameters that yield a finitely transient policy
with n∗ = 2.
6. Uniform samples from Belief space. Recall that the belief space Π(X) is the unit
X − 1 dimensional simplex. Show that a convenient way of sampling uniformly
from Π(X) is to use the Dirichlet distribution (i.e., pi0(i) = xi/
∑
i xi, where xi ∼
unit exponential distribution).
7. Adaptive Control of a fully observed MDP formulated as a POMDP problem.
Consider a fully observed MDP with transition matrix P (u) and cost c(i, u), where
u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , U} denotes the action. Suppose the true transition matrices P (u) are
not known. However, it is known apriori that they belong to a known finite set of
matrices P (u, θ) where θ ∈ {1, 2, , . . . , L}. As data accumulates, the controller must
simultaneously control the Markov chain and also estimate the transition matrices.
The above problem can be formulated straightforwardly as a POMDP. Let θk denote
the parameter process. Since the parameter θk = θ does not evolve with time, it has
identity transition matrix. Note that θ is not known; it is partially observed since we
only see the sample path realization of the Markov chain x with transition matrix
P (u, θk).
Aim: Compute the optimal policy
µ∗ = argmin
µ
Jµ(pi0) = E{
N−1∑
k=0
c
(
xk, uk
)|pi0}
where pi0 is the prior pmf of θ. The key point here is that as in a POMDP (and unlike
an MDP), the action uk will now depend on history of past actions and trajectory of
the Markov chain as we will now describe.
Formulation: Define the augmented state (xk, θk). Since θk = θ does not evolve,
clearly the augmented state has transition probabilities
P(xk+1 = j, θk+1 = m|xk = i, θk = l, uk = u) = Pij(u, l) δ(l −m)
At time k, denote the history as Hk = {x0, . . . , xk, u1, . . . , uk−1}. Then define the
belief state which is the posterior pmf of the model parameter estimate:
pik(l) = P(θk = l|Hk), l = 1, 2. . . . , L.
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(a) Show that the posterior is updated via Bayes’ formula as
pik+1(l) = T (pik, xk, xk+1, uk)(l)
defn
=
Pxk,xk+1(uk, l)pik(l)
σ(pik, xk, xk+1)
, l = 1, 2. . . . , L
where σ(pik, xk, xk+1, uk) =
∑
m
Pxk,xk+1(uk,m)pik(m).
(17)
Note that pik lives in the L− 1 dimensional unit simplex.
Define the belief state as (xk, pik). The actions are then chosen as
uk = µk(xk, pik)
Then the optimal policy µ∗k(i, pi) satisfies Bellman’s equation
Jk(i, pi) = min
u
Qk(i, u, pi), µ
∗
k(i, pi) = argmin
u
Qk(i, u, pi)
Qk(i, u, pi) = c(i, u) +
∑
j
Jk+1
(
j, T (pi, i, j, u)
)
σ(pi, i, j, u)
(18)
initialized with the terminal cost JN (i, pi) = cN (i).
(b) Show that the value function Jk is piecewise linear and concave in pi. Also
show how the exact POMDP solution algorithms in Chapter ?? can be used to
compute the optimal policy.
The above problem is related to the concept of dual control which dates back to the
1960s [24]; see also [54] for the use of Lovejoy’s suboptimal algorithm to this prob-
lem. Dual control relates to the tradeoff between estimation and control: if the con-
troller is uncertain about the model parameter, it needs to control the system more
aggressively in order to probe the system to estimate it; if the controller is more
certain about about the model parameter, it can deploy a less aggressive control.
In other words, initially the controller explores and as the controller becomes more
certain it exploits. Multi-armed bandit problems optimize the tradeoff between ex-
ploration and exploitation.
Chapter 8
POMDPs in Controlled Sensing and
Sensor Scheduling
1. Optimal Observer Trajectory for Estimating a Markovian Target. This problem is
identical to the search problem described in §??. A target moves in space according
to a Markov chain. (For convenience assume X-cells in two dimensional space. A
moving observer (sensor) measures the target’s state (position) in noise. Assume
that the noise depends on the relative distance between the target and the observer.
How should the observer move amongst the X-cells in order to locate where the
target is? One metric that has been used in the literature [50] is the stochastic ob-
servability (which is related to the mutual information) of the target; see also §??.
The aim of the observer is to move to maximize the stochastic observability of the
target. As described in §??, the problem is equivalent to a POMDP.
A more fancy version of the setup involves multiple observers (sensors) that move
within the state space and collaboratively seek to locate the target. Assume that the
observers exchange information about their observations and actions. The problem
can again be formulated as a POMDP with a larger action and observation space.
Suppose the exchange of information between the observers occurs over a noisy
communication channel where the error probabilities evolve according to a Markov
chain as in §??. Formulate the problem as a POMDP.
2. Risk averse sensor scheduling. As described in §??, in controlled sensing applica-
tions, one is interested in incorporating the uncertainty in the state estimate into the
instantaneous cost. This cannot be modeled using a linear cost since the uncertainty
is minimized at each vertex of the simplex Π(X). In §??, quadratic functions of the
belief were used to model the conditional variance. A more principled alternative is
to use dynamic coherent risk measures; recall three examples of such risk measures
were discussed in §??.
Discuss how open loop feedback control can be used for a POMDP with dynamic
coherent risk measure.
3. Sensor Usage Constraints. The aim here is to show that the above algorithms can
be modified straightforwardly to incorporate constraints on the total usage of par-
ticular sensors. Such constraints are often used in sensor resource management.
(a) Consider a N horizon problem where sensor 1 can be used at most L times
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where L ≤ N . For notational simplicity, assume that there are two sensors,
so U = {1, 2}. Assume that there are no constraints on the usage of the other
sensors.
For notational convenience we consider rewards denoted asR(pi, u) =
∑X
i=1R(i, u)pi(i)
instead of costs C(pi, u) expressed in terms of the belief state pi. Show that Bell-
man’s equation is given by
Vn+1(pi, l) = max{R(pi, 1) +
∑
y
Vn(T (pi, y, 1), l − 1)σ(pi, y, 1),
R(pi, 2) +
∑
y
Vn(T (pi, y, 2), l)σ(pi, y, 2)}
with boundary condition Vn(pi, 0) = 0, n = 0, 1, . . . , N .
(b) If the constraint is that sensor 1 needs to be used exactly L times, then show
that the following additional boundary condition needs to be included:
Vn(pi, n) = R(pi, 1) +
∑
y
Vn−1(T (pi, y, 1), n− 1)σ(pi, y, 1), for n = 1, . . . , L.
(c) In terms of the POMDP solver software, the constraint for using sensor 1 at
most L times is easily incorporated by augmenting the state space. Define the
controlled finite state process rk ∈ {0, 2, . . . , L}with (L+1)× (L+1) transition
matrices
Q(1) =

0 1 0 · · · 0
0 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . . 1
0 0 0 · · · 1
 , Q(2) = I.
Then define the POMDP with:
• transition matrices P (1)⊗Q(1) and P (2)⊗Q(2),
• observation probabilities p(y|x, r, u) = p(y|x, u),
• rewards R(x, r, u) = R(x, u) for r > 0 and R(x, r = 0, u) = 0.
In the problems for Chapter ??, we consider a simpler version of the above problem
for optimal measurement selection of a HMM. In that simpler case, one can develop
structural results for the optimal policy.
Chapter 9
Structural Results for Markov
Decision Processes
1. Invariance of optimal policy to costs. Recall that Theorem ?? require that the MDP
costs satisfy assumptions (A1) and (A3) for the optimal policy to be monotone.
Show that for a discounted cost infinite horizon MDP, assumption (A1) and (A3)
can be relaxed as follows:
There exists a single vector φ ∈ IRX such that for every action u ∈ U ,
(A1’) (I − ρP (u))φ is a vector with increasing elements. (Recall ρ is the discount
factor.)
(A3’) (P (u+ 1)− P (u))φ is a vector with decreasing elements.
In other words the structure of the transition matrix is enough to ensure a monotone
policy and no assumptions are required on the cost (of course the costs are assumed
to be bounded)
Hint: Define the new value function V¯ (i) = V (i)− φ(i) . Clearly the optimal policy
remains unchanged. Also V¯ satisfies Bellman’s equation
V¯ (i) = min
u
{c(i, u)− φ(i) + ρ
∑
j
φ(j)Pij(u) + ρ
∑
j
V¯ (j)Pij(u)}
2. Myopic lower bound to optimal policy. Recall that supermodularity of the transi-
tion matrix (A4) was a key requirement for the optimal policy to be monotone. In
particular Theorem ?? shows that Q(i, u) is submodular, i.e., Q(i, u + 1)−Q(i, u) is
decreasing in i. Sometimes supermodularity of the transition matrix is too much to
ask for. Consider instead of (A4) the relaxed condition
(A4’) Pi(u+ 1) ≥s Pi(u) for each row i.
Show that (A4’) together with (A1), (A2) implies that∑
j
Pij(u+ 1)V (j) ≤
∑
j
Pij(u)V (j)
Define the myopic policy µ(i) = argminu c(i, u). Show that under (A1), (A2), (A4’),
µ∗(i) ≥ µ(i). In other words the myopic policy µ forms a lower bound to the optimal
policy µ∗.
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3. Monotone policy iteration algorithm. Suppose an MDP has a monotone policy. If
the MDP parameters are known, then the policy iteration algorithm of §?? can be
used. If the policy µn−1 at iteration n − 1 is monotone then show that under the
assumptions of (A1), (A2) of Theorem ??, the policy evaluation step yields Jµn−1 as
a decreasing vector. Also show that under (A1)-(A4), (a similar proof to Theorem ??)
implies that the policy improvement step yields µn that is monotone. So the policy
iteration algorithm will automatically be confined to monotone policies if initialized
by a monotone policy.
4. Stochastic knapsack problem. Consider the following version fo the stochastic
knapsack problem; 1 see [77] and also [15]. A machine must operate for T time
points. Suppose that one specific component of the machine fails intermittently.
This component is replaced when it fails. There are u-possible brands one can
choose to replace this component when it fails. Brand u ∈ {1, 2 . . . , U} costs cu
and has an operating lifetime that is exponentially distributed with rate λu. The aim
is to minimize the expected total cost incurred by replacing the failed component so
that the machine operates for T time points.
Suppose a component has just failed. Let t denotes the remaining time left to operate
the machine. The optimal policy for choosing which of the U possible brands to
choose the replacement satisfies Bellman’s equation
Q(t, u) = c(u) +
∫ t
0
V (t− τ)λue−λuτdτ, Q(0, u) = 0,
V (t) = min
u∈{1,2,...,U}
Q(t, u), µ∗(t) = argmin
u∈{1,2,...,U}
Q(t, u)
Show that if λuc(u) is decreasing with u, then Q(t, u) is submodular. In particular,
show that
d
dt
Q(t, u) = λuc(u)
Therefore, the optimal policy µ∗(t) has the following structure: Use brand 1 when
the time remaining is small, then switch to brand 2 when the time increases, then
brand 3, etc.
Generalize the above result to the case when time k is discrete and the brand u has
life time pmf p(k, u), k = 0, 1 . . .. Then Bellman’s equation reads
Q(n, u) = c(u) +
n∑
k=0
V (n− k) p(k, u)
V (n) = min
u∈{1,2,...,U}
Q(n, u), µ∗(n) = argmin
u∈{1,2,...,U}
Q(n, u)
What are sufficient conditions in terms of submodularity of the lifetime pmf p(k, u)
for the optimal policy to be monotone?
5. Monotonicity of optimal policy with respect to horizon. Show that the following
result holds for a finite horizon MDP. If Qn(i, u) is supermodular in (i, u, n) then
1The classical NP hard knapsack problem deals with U items with costs c(1), c(2), . . . , c(U) and lifetimes
t1, t2, . . . tU . The aim is to compute the minimum cost subset of these items whose total lifetime is at most T .
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Vn(i) = maxuQn(i, u) is supermodular in i, u. Note that checking supermodularity
with respect to (i, u, n) is pairwise: namely it suffices to check supermodularity with
respect to (i, u), (i, n) and (u, n).
With the above result, consider a finite horizon MDP satisfies the assumptions (A1)-
(A4) of §??. Under what further conditions is µ∗n(i) is increasing in n for fixed i?
What does this mean intuitively?
Chapter 10
Structural Results for Optimal Filters
1. In the structural results presented in the book, we have only considered first order
stochastic dominance and monotone likelihood ratio dominance (MLR) since they
are sufficient for our purposes. Naturally there are many other concepts of stochas-
tic dominance [62]. Show that
MLR =⇒ Hazard rate order =⇒ first order =⇒ second order
Even though second order stochastic dominance is useful for concave decreasing
functions (such as the value function of a POMDP), just like first order dominance,
it cannot cope with conditioning (Bayes’ rule).
2. Consider a reversible Markov chain with transition matrix P , initial distribution pi0
and stationary distribution pi∞. Suppose pi0 ≤r pi∞. Show that if P has rows that are
first order increasing then pin ≤r pi∞..
3. Importance sampling filter that exploits the MLR constraints.
4. Optimal predictor and first order dominance. Can use this in conjunction with a
particle filter.
5. The posterior Cramer Rao bound [84] for filtering can be used to compute a lower
bound to the mean square error. This requires twice differentiability of the logarithm
of the joint density. For HMMs, one possibility is to consider the Weiss-Weinstein
bounds , see [75]. Alternatively, the analysis of [29] can be used. Please compare
these with the sample path bounds for the HMM filter obtained in this chapter.
6. The shifted likelihood ratio order is a stronger order than the MLR order. Indeed,
p > q in the shifted likelihood ratio order sense if pi/qi+j is increasing in i for any j.
(If j = 0 it coincides with the standard MLR order.) What additional assumptions
are required to preserve the shifted likelihood ratio order under Bayes’ rule. The
shifted likelihood ratio order is closed under convolution. How can this property
be exploited to bound an optimal filter?
7. In deriving sample path bounds for the optimal filter, we did not exploit the fact that
T (pi, y) increases with y. How can this fact be used in bounding the sample path of
an optimal filter?
8. Neyman-Pearson Detector Here we briefly review elementary Neyman-Pearson
detection theory and show the classical result that MLR dominance results in a
threshold optimal detector.
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Given the observation x of a random variable, we wish to decide if x is from pdf f
or g. To do this, we construct a decision policy φ(x). The detector decides
f if φ(x) = 0
g if φ(x) = 1
(19)
The performance of the decision policy φ in (19) is determined in terms of two met-
rics:
(a) P = P( reject f |f is true )
(b) Q = P( reject f |f is false )
Clearly for the decision policy φ(·) in (19),
P =
∫
IR
f(x)φ(x)dx, Q =
∫
IR
g(x)φ(x)dx.
The famous Neyman-Pearson detector seeks to determine the optimal decision pol-
icy φ∗ that maximizes Q subject to the constraint P ≤ α for some user specified
α ∈ (0, 1]. The main result is
Theorem (Neyman-Pearson lemma). Amongst all decision rules φ such that P ≤ α, the
decision rule φ∗ which maximizes Q is given by
φ∗(x) =
{
0 f(x)g(x) ≥ c
1 f(x)g(x) < c
where c is chosen so that P = α.
Proof. Clearly for any x ∈ IR,(
φ∗(x)− φ(x))(cg(x) = f(x)) ≥ 0.
Please verify the above inequality by showing that if φ∗(x) = 1 then both the terms
in the above product are nonnegative; while if φ∗(x) = 0, then both the terms are
nonpositive. Therefore,
c
(∫
φ∗(x)g(x)dx−
∫
φ(x)g(x)dx
)
≥
∫
φ∗(x)f(x)dx−
∫
φ(x)f(x)dx
The right hand side is non-negative since by construction
∫
φ∗(x)f(x)dx = α , while∫
φ(x)f(x)dx ≤ α.
Threshold structure of optimal detector. Let us now give conditions so that the
optimal Neyman-Pearson decision policy is a threshold policy: Suppose now that f
MLR dominates g, that is f(x)/g(x) ↑ x. Then clearly
φ∗(x) =
{
0 x ≥ x∗
1 x < x∗
(20)
where threshold x∗ satisfies ∫ x∗
−∞
f(x)dx = α
Thus if f ≥r g, then the optimal detector (in the Neyman-Pearson sense) is the
threshold detector (20).
Chapter 11
Monotonicity of Value Function for
POMDPs
1. Theorem ?? is the main result of the chapter and it gives conditions under which the
value function of a POMDP is MLR decreasing. Condition ?? was the main assump-
tion on the possibly non-linear cost. Give sufficient conditions for a quadratic cost
1−pi′pi+c′upi to satisfy ??. For what conditions on the entropy−
∑
i pi(i) log pi(i)+c
′
upi
satisfy ??.
2. The shifted likelihood ratio order is a stronger order than the MLR order. Indeed,
p > q in the shifted likelihood ratio order sense if pi/qi+j is increasing in i for any j.
(If j = 0 it coincides with the standard MLR order.) By using the shifted likelihood
ratio order, what further results on the value function V (pi) can one get by using
Theorem ??.
3. Theorem ?? gives sufficient conditions for a 2-state POMDP to have a threshold pol-
icy. We have assumed that the observation probabilities are not action dependent.
How should the assumptions and proof be modified to allow for action dependent
observation probabilities?
4. How can Theorem ?? be modified is dynamic risk measures of §?? are considered?
(see also §??).
5. Finite dimensional characterization of Gittins index for POMDP bandit [48]: §??
dealt with POMDP multi-armed bandit problem. Consider a POMDP bandit where
the Gittins index (??) is characterized as the solution of Bellman’s equation (??).
Since the value function of a POMDP is piecewise linear and concave (and therefore
a finite dimensional characterization), it follows that a value iteration algorithm for
(??) that characterizes the Gittins index also has a finite dimensional characteriza-
tion. Obtain an expression for this finite dimensional characterization for the Gittins
index (??) for a horizon N value iteration algorithm.
6. §?? deals with structural results for POMDP bandits. Consider the problem where
several searchers are looking for a stationary target. Only one searcher can operate
at a given time and the searchers cannot receive state estimate information from
other searchers or a base-station. The base station simply sends a 0 or 1 signal to each
searcher telling them when to operate and when t shut down. When it operates, the
searcher obtains moves according to a Markov chain and obtains noisy information
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about the target. Show how the problem can be formulated as a POMDP multi-
armed bandit.
Show how a radar seeking to hide its emissions (low probability of intercept radar)
can be formulated approximately as a POMDP bandit.
7. How does the structural result for the Gittins index for a POMDP bandit specialize
to that of a full observed bandit?
8. Consider Problem 7 on page 26 of Chapter ?? where optimal adaptive control of a
fully observed MDP was formulated as a POMDP. Give conditions that ensure that
the value function Jk(i, pi) is MLR decreasing in pi and also monotone in i. What are
its implications in terms of dual control (i.e., exploration vs exploitation)?
Chapter 12
Structural Results for Stopping Time
POMDPs
12.1 Problems
Most results in stopping time POMDPs in the literature use the fact that the stopping set
is convex (namely, Theorem ??). Recall that the only requirements of Theorem ?? are that
the value function is convex and the stopping cost is linear. Another important result
for finite horizon POMDP stopping time problems is the nested property stopping set
property S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2 . . .. The following exercises discuss both these aspects.
1. Nested stopping set structure. Consider the stopping time POMDP dynamic pro-
gramming equation
V (pi) = min{c′1pi, c′2pi +
∑
y
V (T (pi, y, u))σ(pi, y, u)}.
Define the stopping set as
S = {pi : c′1pi ≤ c′2pi +
∑
y
V (T (pi, y, u))σ(pi, y, u)} = {pi : µ∗(pi) = 1 (stop) }
Recall the value iteration algorithm is
Vn+1(pi) = min{c′1pi, c′2pi +
∑
y
Vn(T (pi, y, u))σ(pi, y, u)}, V0(pi) = 0.
Define the stopping sets Sn = {pi : c′1pi ≤ c′2pi +
∑
y Vn(T (pi, y, u))σ(pi, y, u)}.
Show that the stopping sets satisfy S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2 . . . implying that
S = ∪nSn
2. Explicit characterization of stopping set. Theorem ?? showed that for a stopping
time POMDP, the stopping set S is convex. By imposing further conditions, the set
S can be determined explicitly. Consider the following set of belief states
So = {pi : c′1pi ≤ c′2pi + c′1P ′pi} (21)
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Suppose the transition matrix P and observation probabilities B of the stopping
time POMDP satisfy the following property:
pi ∈ So =⇒ T (pi, y) ∈ So, ∀y ∈ Y. (22)
(a) Prove that So = S. Therefore, the hyperplane c′1pi = c′2pi + c′1P ′pi determines
the stopping set S.
The proof proceeds in two steps: First prove by induction on the value iteration
algorithm that for pi ∈ So, Vn(pi) = c′1pi, for n = 1, 2 . . ..
Second, consider a belief pi such that the optimal policy goes one step and then
stops. This implies that the value function is V (pi) = c′2pi + c′1P ′pi. Therefore
clearly c′2pi + c′1P ′pi < c′1pi. This implies that pi /∈ So. So for any belief pi such
that µ∗(pi) goes one step and stops, then pi /∈ So. Therefore, for any belief pi
such that µ∗(pi) goes more than one step and stops, then pi /∈ So.
The two steps imply that So = S.Therefore that the stopping set is explicitly
given by the polytope in (21).
(b) Give sufficient conditions on P and B so that condition (22) holds for a stop-
ping time POMDP.
3. Show that an identical, proof to Theorem ?? implies that the stopping sets Sn, n =
1, 2, . . . are convex for a finite horizon problem.
4. Choosing a single sample from a HMM. Suppose a Markov chain xk is observed in
noise sequentially over time as yk ∼ Bxk,y, k = 1, 2 . . . , N . Over a horizon of length
N , I need to choose a single observation yk to maximize E{yk}, k ∈ 1, . . . , N . If at
time k I decide to choose observation yk, then I get reward E{yk} and the problem
stops. If I decide not to choose observation yk, then I can use it to update my estimate
of the state and proceed to the next time instant. However, I am not allowed to
choose yk at a later time.
(a) Which single observation should I choose?
Show that Bellman’s equation becomes
Vn+1(pi) = max
u∈{1,2}
{r′pi,
∑
y
Vn(T (pi, y))σ(pi, y)}
where the elements of r are r(i) =
∑
y yBiy, i = 1, . . . , X . Here u = 1 denotes
choose an observation, while u = 2 denotes do not choose an observation.
(b) Show using an identical proof to Theorem ?? that the region of the belief space
Sn = {pi : µ∗(µ) = 1} is convex. Moreover if (??,??) hold, show that e1 belongs
to Sn. Also show that S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2 . . ..
(c) Optimal Channel sensing. Another interpretation of the above problem is as
follows: The quality xk of a communication channel is observed in noise. I
need to transmit a packet using this channel. If the channel is in state x, I incur
a cost c(x) for transmission. Given N slots, when should I transmit?
5. Optimal measurement selection for a Hidden Markov Model (Multiple stopping
problem). The following problem generalizes the previous problem as follows. I
need to choose the best L observations of a Hidden Markov model in a horizon of
length N where L ≤ N? If I select observation k then I get a reward E{yk}, if I
reject the observation then I get no reward. In either case, I use the observation yk to
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update my belief state. (This problem is also called the multiple stopping problem
in [64].) Show that Bellman’s dynamic programming recursion reads:
Vn+1(pi, l) = max{r′pi +
∑
y
Vn(T (pi, y), l − 1)σ(pi, y),∑
y
Vn(T (pi, y), l)σ(pi, y)}, n = 1, . . . , N
with initial condition Vn(pi, 0) = 0, n = 0, 1, . . . and boundary conditions
Vn(pi, n) = r
′pi +
∑
y
Vn−1(T (pi, y), n− 1)σ(pi, Y ), n = 1, . . . , L.
The boundary condition says that if I have only n time points left to make n obser-
vations, then I need to make an observation at each of these n time points. Obtain
a structural result for the optimal measurement selection policy. (Notice that the ac-
tions do no affect the evolution of the belief state pi, they only affect l, so the problem
is simpler than a full blown POMDP.)
6. Separable POMDPs. Recall that the action space is denoted as U = {1, 2, . . . , U}. In
analogy to [33, Chapter 7.4], define a POMDP to be separable if: the exists a subset
U¯ = {1, 2 . . . , U¯} of the action space U such that for u ∈ U¯
(a) The cost is additively separable: c(x, u) = φ(u)+g(x) for some scalars φ(u) and
g(x).
(b) The transition matrix Pij(u) depends only on j. That is the process evolves
independently of the previous state.
Assuming that the actions u ∈ U¯ are ordered so that φ(1) < φ(2) < . . . < φ(U¯),
clearly it is never optimal to pick actions 2, . . . , U¯ . So solving the POMDP involves
choosing between actions {1, U¯ + 1, . . . , U}. Clearly from Theorem ??, the set of
beliefs where the optimal policy µ∗(pi) = 1 is convex.
Solving for the optimal policy for which the actions {U¯ + 1, . . . , U} arise is still as
complex as a solving a standard POMDP. However, the bounds proposed in Chapter
?? can be used.
Consider the special case of the above model where U¯ = U and instead of (a), c(x, u)
are arbitrary costs. Then show that the optimal policy is a linear threshold policy.
12.2 Case Study: Bayesian Nash equilibrium of one-shot global
game for coordinated sensing
This section gives a short description of Bayesian global games. The ideas involve MLR
dominance of posterior distributions and supermodularity and serves as a useful illustra-
tion of the structural results developed in the chapter.
We start with some perspective: Recall that in the classical Bayesian social learning,
agents act sequentially in time. The global games model that has been studied in eco-
nomics during the last two decades, considers multiple agents that act simultaneously by
predicting the behavior of other agents. The theory of global games was first introduced
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in [12] as a tool for refining equilibria in economic game theory; see [59] for an excel-
lent exposition. Global games represent a useful method for decentralized coordination
amongst agents; they have been used to model speculative currency attacks and regime
change in social systems, see [59, 37, 4].
12.2.1 Global Game Model
Consider a continuum of agents in which each agent i obtains noisy measurements Y (i)
of an underlying state of nature X . Here
Y (i) = X +W (i), X ∼ pi, W (i) ∼ pW (·)
Assume all agents have the same noise distribution pW . Based on its observation y(i),
each agent takes an action ui ∈ {1, 2} to optimize its expected reward
R(X,α, u = 2) = X + f(α), R(X,u = 1) = 0 (23)
Here α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of agents that choose action 2 and f(α) is a user
specified function. We will call f the congestion function for reasons explained below.
For example, suppose x (state of nature) denotes the quality of a social group and y(i)
denotes the measurement of this quality by agent i. The action ui = 1 means that agent
i decides not to join the social group, while ui = 2 means that agent i joins the group.
The utility function R(ui = 2, α) for joining the social group depends on α, where α is
the fraction of people who decide to join the group. If α ≈ 1, i.e., too many people join
the group, then the utility to each agent is small since the group is too congested and
agents do not receive sufficient individual service. On the other hand, if α ≈ 0, i.e., too
few people join the group, then the utility is also small since there is not enough social
interaction. In this case the congestion function f(α) would be chosen as a quasi-concave
function of α (that increases with α up to a certain value of α and then decreases with α).
Since each agent is rational, it uses its observation y(i) to predict α, i.e., the fraction of
other agents that choose action 2. The main question is: What is the optimal strategy for each
agent i to maximize its expected reward?
12.2.2 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Let us now formulate this problem: Each agent chooses its action u ∈ {1, 2} based on a
(possibly randomized) strategy µ(i) that maps the current observation Y (i) to the action
u. In a global game we are interested in symmetric strategies, i.e., where all all choose the
same strategy denoted as µ. That is, each agent i deploys the strategy
µ : Y (i) → {1, 2}.
(Of course, the action µ(Y (i)) picked by individual agents i depend on their random obser-
vation Y (i). So the actions picked are not necessarily identical even though the strategies
are identical).
Let α(x) denote the fraction of agents that select action u = 2 (go) given the quality
of music X = x. Since we are considering an infinite number of agents that behave
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independently, α(x) is also (with probability 1) the conditional probability that an agent
receives signal Y (i) and decides to pick u = 2, given X . So
α(x) = P (µ(Y ) = 2|X = x). (24)
We can now define the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the global game. For each
agent i given its observation Y (i), the goal is to choose a strategy to optimize its local
reward. That is, agent i seeks to compute strategy µ(i),∗ such that
µ(i),∗(Y (i)) ∈ {1 (stay) , 2 (go) }maximizes E[R(X,α(X), µ(i)(Y (i)))|Y (i)]. (25)
Here R(X,α(X), u) is defined as in (23) with α(X) defined in (24).
If such a strategy µ(i),∗ in (25) exists and is the same for all agents i, then they consti-
tute a symmetric BNE for the global game. We will use the notation µ∗(Y ) to denote this
symmetric BNE.
Remark: Since we are dealing with an incomplete information game, players use random-
ized strategies. If a BNE exists, then a pure (non-randomized) version exists straightfor-
wardly (see Proposition 8E.1, pp.225 in [57]). Indeed, with y(i) denoting realization of
random variable Y (i),
E[R
(
X,α(X), µ(Y (i))
)|Y (i) = y(i)] = 2∑
u=1
E[R(X,α(X), u)|Y (i) = y(i)]P (u|Y (i) = y(i)).
Since a linear combination is maximized at its extreme values, the optimal (BNE) strategy
is to choose P (u∗|Y (i) = y(i)) = 1 where
u∗ = µ∗(y(i)) = argmax
u∈{1,2}
E[R(X,α(X), u)|Y (i) = y(i)]. (26)
For notational convenience denote
R(y, u) = E[R(X,α(X), u)|Y (i) = y(i)]
12.2.3 Main Result. Monotone BNE
With the above description, we will now give sufficient conditions for the BNE µ∗(y) to
be monotone increasing in y (denoted µ∗(y) ↑ y). This implies that the BNE is a threshold
policy of the form:
µ∗(y) =
{
1 y ≤ y∗
2 y > y∗
Before proving this monotone structure, first note that µ∗(y) ↑ y implies that α(x) in (24)
becomes
α(x) = P (y > y∗|X = x) = P (x+ w > y∗) = P (w > y∗ − x) = 1− FW (y∗ − x)
Clearly from (26), a sufficient condition for µ∗(y) ↑ y is that
R(y, u) =
∫
R(x, α(x), u) p(x|y)dx
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is supermodular in (y, u) that is
R(y, u+ 1)−R(y, u) ↑ y.
Since R(X,u = 0) it follows that R(y, 1) = 0. So it suffices that R(y, 2) ↑ y.
1. What are sufficient conditions on the noise pdf pW (·), and congestion function f(·)
in (23) so that R(y, 2) ↑ y and so BNE µ∗(y) ↑ y?
Clearly sufficient conditions for R(y, 2) ↑ y are:
(a) p(x|y) is MLR increasing in y,
(b) IR(x, α(x), 2) is increasing in x.
But we know that p(x|y) is MLR increasing in y if the noise distribution is such that
pW (y − x) is TP2 in x, y
Also R(x, α(x), 2) is increasing in x if its derivative wrt x is positive. That is,
d
dx
R(x, α(x), 2) = 1 +
df
dα
dα
dx
= 1 +
df
dα
pW (y
∗ − x) > 0
To summarize: The BNE µ∗(y) ↑ y if the following two conditions hold:
(a) p(y|x) = pW (y − x) is TP2 in (x, y)
(b)
df
dα
> − 1
pW (y∗ − x)
Note that a sufficient condition for the second condition is that
df
dα
> − 1
maxw pW (w)
2. Suppose W is uniformly distributed in [−1.1]. Then using the above conditions
show that a sufficient condition on the congestion function f(α) for the BNE to be
monotone is that df/dα > −2.
3. Suppose W is zero mean Gaussian noise with variance σ2. Then using the above
conditions show that a sufficient condition on the congestion function f(α) for the
BNE to be monotone is that df/dα > −√2piσ.
12.2.4 One-shot HMM Global Game
Suppose that X0 ∼ pi0, and given X0, X1 is obtained by simulating from transition
matrix P . The observation for agent i is obtained as the HMM observation
Y (i) = X1 +W
(i), W (i) ∼ pW (·).
In analogy to the above derivation, characterize the BNE of the resulting one-shot
HMM global game. (This will require assuming that P is TP2.)
Chapter 13
Stopping Time POMDPs for
Quickest Change Detection
1. Classical Bayesian sequential detection. This problem shows that classical Bayesian
sequential detection is a trivial case of the results developed in Chapter ??.
Consider a random variable x ∈ {1, 2}. So the transition matrix is P = I . Given
noisy observations yk ∼ Bxy, the aim is to decide if the underlying state is either 1
or 2. Taking stop action 1 declares that the state is 1 and stops. Taking stop action 2
declares that the state is 2 and stops. Taking action 3 at time k simply takes another
measurement yk+1. The misclassification costs are:
c(x = 2, u = 1) = c(x = 1, u = 2) = L.
The cost of taking an additional measurement is c(x, u = 3) = C. What is the
optimal policy µ∗(pi)?
Since P = I , show that the dynamic programming equation reads
V (pi) = min{pi2L, pi1L, C +
∑
y
V (T (pi, y))σ(pi, y)}
T (pi, y) =
Bypi
1′Bypi
, σ(pi, y) = 1′Bypi,
where pi = [pi(1), pi(2)]′ is the belief state. Note that y ∈ Y where Y can be finite or
continuum (in which case
∑
denotes integration over Y).
From Theorem ?? we immediately know that the stopping sets
R1 = {pi : µ∗(pi) = 1}, andR2 = {pi : µ∗(pi) = 2}
are convex sets. Since the belief state is two dimensional, in terms of the second
component pi(2), R1 and R2 are intervals in the unit interval [0, 1]. Clearly pi(2) =
0 ∈ R1 and pi(2) = 1 inR2. ThereforeR1 = [0, pi∗1] andR2 = [pi∗2, 1] for some pi∗1 ≤ pi∗2 .
So the continue region is [pi∗1, pi∗2].
Of course, Theorem ?? is much more general since it does not require X = 2 states
and xk can evolve according to a Markov chain with transition matrix P (whereas
in the simplistic setting above, x is a random variable).
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2. Order book high frequency trading and social learning. Agent based models for
high frequency trading with an order book have been studied a lot recently [6].
Agents trade (buy or sell) stocks by exploiting information about the decisions of
previous agents (social learning) via an order book in addition to a private (noisy)
signal they receive on the value of the stock. We are interested in the following:
(1) Modeling the dynamics of these risk averse agents, (2) Sequential detection of a
market shock based on the behavior of these agents.
The agents perform social learning according to the protocol of §??. A market maker
needs to decide based on the actions of the agents if there is a sudden change (shock)
in the underlying value of an asset. Assume that the shock occurs with a phase
distributed change time. The individual agents perform social learning with a CVaR
social learning filter as in §??. The market maker aims to determine the shock as soon
as possible.
Formulate this decision problem as a quickest detection problem. Simulate the value
function and optimal policy. Compare it with the market maker’s optimal policy
obtained when the agents perform risk neutral social learning.
Chapter 14
Myopic Policy Bounds for POMDPs
and Sensitivity
1. To obtain upper and lower bounds to the optimal policy, the key idea was to change
the cost vector but still preserve the optimal policy. What if a nonlinear cost was
subtracted from the costs thereby still keeping the optimal policy the same. Does
that allow for larger regions of the belief space where the upper and lower bounds
coincide? Is it possible to construct different transition matrices that yield the same
optimal policy?
2. In [?] is is assumed that one can construct a POMDP with observation matrices
B(1), B(2) such that (i) T (pi, y, 2) ≥r T (pi, y, 1) for each y and (ii) σ(pi, 2) ≥s σ(pi, 1).
Prove that it is impossible to construct an example that satisfies (i) and (ii) apart
from the trivial case whereB(1) = B(2). Therefore Theorem ?? does not apply when
the transition probabilities are the same and only the observation probabilities are
action dependent. For such cases, Blackwell dominance is used.
3. Extensions of Blackwell dominance idea in POMDPs to more general cases. Black-
well dominance was used in §?? to construct myopic policies that bound the optimal
policy of a POMDP. But Blackwell dominance is quite finicky. In Theorem ?? we as-
sumed that the POMDP has dependency structure x → y(2) → y(1). That is, the
observation distributions are B(2) = p(y(2)|x) and B(1) = p(y(1)|y(2)).
(a) Recall the proof of Theorem ?? which is written element wise below for maxi-
mum clarity:
Tj(pi, y
(1), 1) =
∑
y(2)
∑
i pi(i)Pijp(y
(2)|j, 2)p(y(1)|y(2))∑
m
∑
y(2)
∑
i pi(i)Pimp(y
(2)|m, 2)p(y(1)|y(2))
=
∑
y(2)
∑
i pi(i)Pijp(y
(2)|j, 2)
((((
((((
((((
(∑
i
∑
m pi(i)Pimp(y
(2)|m, 2)(((
((((
((((
((∑
i
∑
m pi(i)Pimp(y
(2)|m,u) p(y(1)|y(2))∑
m
∑
y(2)
∑
i pi(i)Pimp(y
(2)|m, 2)p(y(1)|y(2))
=
∑
y(2) Tj(pi, y
(2), 2)σ(pi, y(2), 2)p(y(1)|y(2))∑
y(2) σ(pi, y
(2), 2)p(y(1)|y(2))
Then clearly σ(pi,y
(2),2)p(y(1)|y(2))∑
y(2)
σ(pi,y(2),2)p(y(1)|y(2)) is a probability measure w.r.t y
(2).
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(b) Consider now the more general POMDP where p(y(1)|y(2), x) depends on the
state x. (In Theorem ?? this was functionally independent of x.) Then
Tj(pi, y
(1), 1) =
∑
y(2) Tj(pi, y
(2), 2)σ(pi, y(2), 2)p(y(1)|y(2), j)∑
y(2)
∑
m σ(pi, y
(2), 2)p(y(1)|y(2),m)
Now
σ(pi, y(2), 2)p(y(1)|y(2), j)∑
y(2)
∑
m σ(pi, y
(2), 2)p(y(1)|y(2),m)
is no longer a probability measure w.r.t. y(2). The proof of Theorem ?? no longer
holds.
(c) Next consider the case where the observation distribution is p(y(2)k |xk, xk−1)
and p(y(1)|y(2)). Then the proof of of Theorem ?? continues to hold.
4. Recall that the structural result involving Blackwell dominance deals with action
dependent observation probabilites but assumes identical transition matrices for the
various actions. Show that copositive dominance and Blackwell dominance can be
combined to deal with a POMDP with action dependent transition and observation
probabilities of the form:
Action u = 1: P 2, B.
Action u = 2: P,B2.
Give numerical examples of POMDPs with the above structure.
Part IV
14.1 Case Study. Online HMM parameter estimation
Consider the loss function for N data points of a HMM or Gaussian state space model:
JN (θ, θ
(l)) = E{
N∑
k=1
cθ(xk, yk, pi
θ
k)|y1:N , θ(l)} (27)
where xk denotes the state, yk denotes the observation, piθk denotes the belief state, θ de-
notes the model variable and θ((l) denotes a fixed value of the model. The slightly strange
notation of conditioning on an existing parameter θ(l) is to facilitate deriving a recursive
EM algorithm.
The aim is to determine the model θ that maximizes this loss function.
An offline gradient algorithm operates iteratively to minimize this loss as follows:
θ(l+1) = θ(l) − ∇θJN (θ, θ(l))
∣∣
θ=θ(l)
(28)
The notation |θ=θ(l) above means that the derivatives are evaluated at θ = θ(l).
An offline Newton type algorithm operates iteratively as follows:
θ(l+1) = θ(l) − [∇2θJN (θ, θ(l))]−1∇θJN (θ, θ(l))∣∣θ=θ(l) (29)
14.1.1 Recursive Gradient and Gauss-Newton Algorithms
A recursive online version of the above gradient algorithm (28) is
θk = θk−1 − 
∫
∇θcθ(xk, yk, piθk)
∣∣
θ=θk−1
pi
θk−1
k (xk) dxk
pi
θk−1
k = T (pi
θk−1
k−1 , yk; θk−1)
(30)
where T (piθk−1k−1 , yk; θk−1) is the optimal filtering recursion at time k using prior pi
θk−1
k−1 ,
model θk−1 and observation yk. The notation |θ=θk−1 above means that the derivatives
are evaluated at θ = θk−1 Finally,  is a small positive step size.
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The recursive Gauss Newton algorithm is an online implementation of (29) and reads
θk = θk−1 − I−1k
∫
∇θcθ(xk, yk, piθk)
∣∣
θ=θk−1
pi
θk−1
k (xk) dxk
Ik = Ik−1 + 
∫
∇2cθ(xk, yk, piθk)
∣∣
θ=θk−1
pi
θk−1
k (xk) dxk
pi
θk−1
k = T (pi
θk−1
k−1 , yk; θk−1)
(31)
Note that the above recursive Gauss Newton is a stochastic approximation algorithm with
a matrix step size Ik.
14.1.2 Justification of (30)
Before proceeding with examples, we give a heuristic derivation of (30). Write (28) as
θ
(k)
k = θ
(k−1)
k − ∇θJN (θ, θ(k−1)k )
∣∣
θ=θ
(k−1)
k
Here the subscript k denotes the estimate based on observations y1:k. The superscript (k)
denotes the iteration of the offline optimization algorithm.
Suppose that at each iteration k we collect one more observation. Then the above
algorithm becomes
θ
(k)
k = θ
(k−1)
k−1 − ∇θJk(θ, θ(k−1)k−1 )
∣∣
θ=θ
(k−1)
k−1
(32)
Introduce the convenient notation
θk = θ
(k)
k .
Next we use the following two crucial approximations:
• First, make the inductive assumption that θk−1 minimized Jk−1(θ, θ(k−1)k−1 ) so that
∇θJk−1(θ, θk−1)
∣∣
θ=θk−1
= 0
Then from (27) it follows that
∇θJk(θ, θk−1)
∣∣
θ=θk−1
= ∇θE{cθ(xk, yk)|y1:k, θk−1}
∣∣
θ=θk−1
(33)
• Note that the right hand side of (33) is
∇θE{cθ(xk, yk)|y1:k, θk−1} =
∫
∇θcθ(xk, yk) p(xk|y1:k, θk−1)dxk
Evaluating this expression requires running a filter from time 0 to k for fixed model
θk−1. We want a recursive approximation for this. It is here that the second approx-
imation is used. We replace p(xk|y1:k, θk−1) by piθkk which is a filtering recursion that
uses the a sequence of available model estimates θt, t = 1, . . . , k at each time t. In
other words, we make the approximation
p(xk|y1:k, θk−1) ≈ piθk−1k = T (pi
θk−1
k−1 , yk; θk), k = 1, 2, , . . . , (34)
To summarize, introducing approximations (33) and (34) in (32) yields the online gradient
algorithm (30). The derivation of the Gauss-Newton algorithm is similar.
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14.1.3 Examples of online HMM estimation algorithm
With the algorithms (30) and (31) we can obtain several types of online HMM parameter
estimators by choosing different loss functions J in (27). Below we outline two popular
choices.
1. Recursive EM algorithm1
Recall from the EM algorithm, that the auxiliary likelihood is
Qn(θ, θn) = E{log(p(x0:n, y1:n|θ)|y1:n, θn)} = E{
n∑
k=1
log pθ(xk, yk|xk−1)|y1:k, θn}
To be more specific, for a HMM, from (??), in the notation of (27),
cθ(xk, yk) = log pθ(xk, yk|xk−1) = logBθxkyk + logP θxk−1,xk
where P θ denotes the transition matrix and Bθ is the observation matrix. Note here cθ is
a reward and not a loss. Therefore
X∑
i=1
cθ(i, yk)pi
θk−1
k (i) =
X∑
i=1
pi
θk−1
k (i) logB
θ
iyk
+
X∑
i=1
X∑
j=1
pi
θk−1
k−1 (i)P
θk−1
ij B
θk−1
jyk
logP θij .
Then a recursive Gauss-Newton stochastic gradient algorithm for maximizing Qn(θ, θn)
yields the following recursive EM algorithm:
θk = θk−1 + I−1k
∑
i
∇θcθ(xk, yk)piθk−1k (i)
Ik = Ik−1 + 
∑
i
∇2cθ(i, yk, piθk)
∣∣
θ=θk−1
pi
θk−1
k (i)
pi
θk−1
k = T (pi
θk−1
k−1 , yk; θk−1) (HMM filter update)
(35)
The first equation has a plus sign since we are maximizing a reward instead of minimizing
a loss.
To ensure that the transition matrix estimates are a valid stochastic matrix, one can
parametrize it in terms of spherical coordinates, see (24).
As an illustrative example, suppose we wish to estimate the X-dimension vector of
state levels g = (g(1), g(2), . . . , g(X))′ of a HMM in zero mean Gaussian noise with known
variance σ2. Assume the transition matrix P is known. Then θ = g and
X∑
i=1
cθ(i, yk)pi
θk−1
k (i) = −
1
2σ2
∑
i
pi
θk−1
k (i)
(
yk − g(i)
)
)2 + constant
1This name is a misnomer. More accurately the algorithm below is a stochastic approximation algorithm
that seeks to approximate the EM algorithm
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2. Recursive Prediction Error (RPE)
Suppose g is the vector of state levels of the underlying Markov chain and P the transition
matrix. Then the model to estimate is θ = (g, P ). Offline prediction error methods seek to
find the model θ that minimizes the loss function
JN (θ) = E{
N∑
k=1
(yk − g′pik|k−1)2}
So squared prediction error at each time k is
cθ(xk, θk, pi
θ
k) =
(
yk − g′P ′piθk−1
)2 (36)
Note that unlike (27) there is no conditional expectation in the loss function. Note the key
difference compared to the recursive EM. In the recursive EM cθ(xk, yk) is functionally
independent of piθ and hence the recursive EM does not involve derivatives (sensitivity)
of the HMM filter. In comparison, the RPE cost (36) involves derivatives of piθk−1 with
respect to θ. Then the derivatives with respect to θ can be evaluated as in §??.
3. Recursive Maximum likelihood
This was discussed in §??. The cost function is
cθ(xk, θk, pi
θ
k) = log
[
1′Byk(θ)pi
θ
k|k−1
]
14.2 Problems
1. Classical RLS vs LMS
2. Convergence of UCB algorithm and comparison with Thompson’s sampling.
3. Switched Markovian games and correlated equilibria.
4. Polyak averaging for stochastic approximations
5. A detection aided test to adapt step size (kim & felisa)
6. Consensus diffusion algorithms for discrete stochastic optimization
7. Design of optimal observer trajectory
8. Stochastic Search-Ruler Algorithm
We discuss two variants of Algorithm ?? that require less restrictive conditions for
convergence than condition (O). Assume cn(θ) are uniformly bounded for θ ∈ Θ. It
is convenient to normalize the objective (??) as follows: Let α ≤ cn(θ) ≤ β where α
denotes a finite lower bound and β > 0 denotes a finite upper bound. Define the
normalized costs mn(θ) as
mn(θ) =
cn(θ)− α
β − α , where 0 ≤ mn(θ) ≤ 1. (37)
Then the stochastic optimization problem (??) is equivalent to
θ∗ = arg min
θ∈Θ
m(θ) where m(θ) = E{mn(θ)} (38)
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since scaling the cost function does not affect the minimizing solution. Recall Θ =
{1, 2, . . . , S}.
Define the loss function
Yn(θ, un) = I (mn(θ)− un) where I(x) =
{
1 if x > 0
0 otherwise
(39)
Here un is a independent uniform random number in [0, 1]. The uniform random
number un is a stochastic ruler against which the candidate mn(θ) is measured. The
result was originally used in devising stochastic ruler optimization algorithms [1]
– although here we propose a more efficient algorithm than the stochastic ruler.
Applying Algorithm ?? to the cost function E{Yn(θ, un)} defined in (39) yields the
following stochastic search-ruler algorithm:
Algorithm I Stochastic Search-Ruler
Identical to Algorithm ?? with cn(θn) and cn(θ˜n) replaced by Yn(θn, un) and Yn(θ˜n, u˜n).
Here un and u˜n are independent uniform random numbers in [0, 1].
Analogous to Theorem ?? we have the following result:
Theorem. Consider the discrete stochastic optimization problem (??). Then the Markov
chain {θn} generated by Algorithm I has the following property for its stationary distribu-
tion pi∞:
pi∞(θ∗)
pi∞(θ)
=
m(θ)
m(θ∗)
(1−m(θ∗))
(1−m(θ)) > 1. (40)
The theorem says that Algorithm I is attracted to set the global minimizers G. It
spends more time in G than any other candidates. The restrictive condition (O) is
not required for Algorithm I to be attracted to G. Theorem 8 gives an explicit rep-
resentation of the discriminative power of the algorithm between the optimizer θ∗
and any other candidate θ in terms of the normalized expected costsm(θ) andm(θ∗).
Algorithm I is more efficient than the stochastic ruler algorithm of [3] when the can-
didate samples are chosen with equal probability. The stochastic ruler algorithm of
[3] has asymptotic efficiency pi(θ∗)/pi(θ) = (1 − m(θ∗))/(1 − m(θ)). So Algorithm
I has the additional improvement in efficiency due to the additional multiplicative
term m(θ)/m(θ∗) in (40).
Variance reduction using common random numbers: A more efficient implementation of
Algorithm I can be obtained by using variance reduction based on common random
numbers (discussed in Appendix ??) as follows: Since un is uniformly distributed
in [0, 1], so is 1 − un. Similar to Theorem 8 it can be shown that the optimizer θ∗
is the minimizing solution of the following stochastic optimization problem θ∗ =
arg minθ E{Zn(θ, un)}where
Zn(θ, un) =
1
2
[Yn(θ, un) + Yn(θ, 1− un)] (41)
where the normalized sample cost mn(θ) is defined in (38). Applying Algorithm
I with Zn(θn, un) and Zn(θ˜n, un) replacing Yn(θn, un) and Yn(θ˜n, un), respectively,
yields the variance reduced search-ruler algorithm.
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In particular, since the indicator function I(·) in (39) is a monotone function of its
argument, it follows that Var{Zn(θ, un)} ≤ Var{Yn(θ, un)}. As a result one would
expect that the stochastic optimization algorithm using Zn would converge faster.
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